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In Bank
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PACIFIC COAST DAIRY, INC. (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Respondents.
[1] Constitutional Law-Police Power-Scope-Extra-territorial

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

Effect.-A state may validly regulate activities, persons, and
property within its jurisdiction, even though extra-territorial
repercussions ensue, whenever such regulation is vital to the
welfare of its inhabitants. The propriety of such regulation
is determined by its focus upon an internal problem, not by
the range of its influence.
Food-Milk-Federal Marketing Agreement Act-Interstate
Commerce: Commerce - Interstate - Shipments to Moffett
Field.-By the definition of interstate or foreign commerce in
the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,
§10(j) (7 U. S. C. A. §610 (j», Congress intended to cover
the broadest possible field that might come within its powers
to regulate interstate commerce and to govern territories. The
definition embraces shipments to such areas as Moffett Field,
where the transit ends. And such shipments come within the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce within the
meaning of the commerce clause.
Id. - Milk - Milk Control Act - Validity. - Althougb the
state milk control act (Agr. Code, §§ 735-738) has repercussions upon shipments of milk into federal territory within the
state, since it is focussed upon the state problem the act does
not run counter to the commerce clause so long as it does not
conflict with the provisions or objectives of Congressional legislation.
ld. - Milk - Milk Control Act - Conflict with Federal Provisions.-While the state milk control act (Agr. Code, §§ 735738)would yield in case of any conflict with any federal marketing agreement or order with respect to the milk industry
involved in interstate commerce, in the absence of any regulations by the federal administrative officer there is no conflict
which affects the application of the state act to the delivery
of milk to federal territory, such as Moffett Field.
Id.-Milk-Milk Control Act-Shipments to Federal Instrumentalities.-The state milk control act can validly affect

[2] See 11 Am. Jur. 58.
McK. Dig; References: [1] Constitutional Law, § 98 (2J
§ 1; Commerce, § 2; [3-5J Food, ~ 1.

Food~

milk sold to instrumentalities of the United States. The act
regulates not the army, but the distributors who are independent contractors with the federal government, and any consequent burden on the government is speculative and remote.
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the dismissal of a
proceeding to revoke the liccnse of a milk distributor. Writ
denied.
Vincent W. Hallinan and Carey Van Fleet for Petitioner.
Frank J. Hennessy, United States Attorney, and William
E. Licking, Assistant United States Attorney, as Amici
Curiae, on behalf of Petitioner.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Wm. T. Sweigert, Assistant
Attorney General, and W. R. Augustine, Deputy Attorney
General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1935 the California legislature passed
an act regulating the marketing and distribution of fluid
milk and fluid cream. (Cal. Agr. Code, Div. 4, ch. 10, secs.
735-738.) The act declares that it is the policy of the state
to promote the intelligent production and orderly l:1arketing
of such essential commodities as milk; that an adequate supply of wholesome milk is vital to the public health; that the
production, transportation, processing, storage, distribution,
and sale of milk and creall1 therefore constitute an industry
affected with a public interest; and that unfair and destructive trade practices in the production, marketing, and distribution of milk and cream have menaced the public health
by undermining sanitary regulations, which cannot of themselves guard against serious deterioration in the supply of
milk. (Agr. Code, sec. 735.) It sets forth as one of its
objectives the elimination of "speculation, waste, improper
marketing, unfair and destructive trade practices, and improper accounting for milk purchased from producers.... "
The act as amended (Stats. 1937, ch. 3, 413, 710; Stats.
1941, ch. 1214) empowers the Director of Agriculture to set
up defined marketing areas within the state, to prescribe
minimum prices for fluid milk and fluid cream to be paid by
distributors to producers in accordance with stabilization
and marketing plans for such areas (secs. 735.4 (b) (4) (5)
and 736.3 (b) (c», to prescribe minimum wholesale and
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retail· prices of fluid milk and fluid cream within each area
(Agr; Code, secs. 736.11, 736.12), to license milk distributors
within each area, to revoke or suspend licenses for violation
of any stabilization and marketing plan, and to bring actions
to enjoin such violations. (Agr. Code, sec. 737.7.)
The petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the
Director of Agriculture to dismiss proceedings undertaken
pursuant to section 737.11 of the Agricultural Code with
the object of revoking petitioner's license. In these proceedings it is alleged that petitioner violated section 736.3 (a)
(6) of the code and of the Stabilization and Marketing Plan
for the Santa Clara Marketing Area by purchasing, processing, bottling, transporting, and delivering in the Santa Clara
Marketing Area fluid milk that it sold to the Federal Government for less than the minimum wholesale prices prescribed
for that area. The sale occurred on Moffett Field, territory
within the geographic boundaries of the Santa Clara .Markcting Area, but subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal government.
Since the demand for fluid milk fluctuates from day to
day and cannot be anticipated exactly, the producers must
supply enough milk to meet all reasonable needs; then any
surplus, or "stand by," is converted into milk products and
sold by the distributors at lower prices, with corresponding
lower receipts for the producers. The possibility of a surplus
has been a constant threat to the stability of prices paid to
the producers, given the reluctance of distributors .to pay
the flill price for milk that becomes in part converted into
milk products. A stabilization plan counteracts this down,
ward pull by establishing minimum prices for fluid· milk.
At the end of a given period, the distributor settles his
accounts with the producer by paying him a "blended price"
representing the price for fluid milk bought less the differ'ilnce between that price and the price for the milk converted
into milk products. Even then the producer does not know
what the blended price will be until the expiration of the
period for settling accounts. The minimum price of fluid
milk, however, represents a fixed element in the blended price
that affords him at least some protection against speCUlation
at his expense in the distribution of milk, If· the distributor
were under no compulsion to pay a minimum price he would
seek to shift to the producer the risk of speculation in a fluctuating market by paying him the lowest possible price, not

only for fluid milk sold to consumers but for milk converted
into milk products, and there would soon be adverse effects
on standards of production.
The same adverse effects would result· if the minimum
price established by a stabilization plan were not uniformly
enforced. The act itself anticipates that possibility by specifying that there may be no departures from the minimum
price even when the milk is sold to the Federal Government
on territory within the exclusive jurisdiction of that government. Section 736.3 (a) provides that any stabilization and
marketing plan shall prohibit distributors and retail stores
from· engaging in such unfair practices as:
" (7) The payment of a lesser price by a distributor to
any producer for fluid milk or fluid cream which is distributed to any person, including agencies of the Federal,
State or local government, located upOn property within the
geographical limits of any marketing area for less than the
minimum prices established by the director to be paid by
distributors to producers for fluid milk or fluid cream for said
marketing area.
I I (8)
The purchasing or receiving of any fluid milk or
fluid cream by distributors from producers within a marketing area wherein a stabilization and marketing plan is in
effect for less than the minimum prices established in sUch
plan, regardless of whether such milk or cream is subsequently sold· or distributed within or. without such marketing
area, or within or without the jurisdiction' of the State of
California. "
.
The validity of such provisions is clear. (Milk Oontrol
Boardv. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346 [59 S. Ct.
528; 83 L. :Ed. 752] ; Alabamav.Kingand Boozer, - - U. S.
-_. [62 S. Ct. 43, - - L. Ed. - - ] ; James v. Dravo Contraoting 00., 302 U. S. 134 [58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155, 114
A. L. R. 318].)
In its original form in 1935 the milk control act prescribed
minimum prices to the producers only. To prescribe such
prices without also prescribing minimum resale prices is ineffectual, however, since the distributors. cannot pay the pro.
ducers the prescribed prices unless they have some guarantee
of corresponding returns. Minimum resale prices, moreover,
must govern all transactions, particularly those of the producer who is his own distributor and who is otherwise apt
to sell to consumers at prices below those at which regular
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distributors are required to operate. In the light of these
considerations, Article 2A was added in 1937 to provide for
minimum wholesale and retail prices. Section 736.11 provides that in all marketing areas where a stabilization and
marketing plan is in effect the Director of Agriculture shall
prescribe minimum wholesale prices at which milk shall be
sold by distributors to retail stores, and minimum retail prices
at which fluid milk shall be sold by distributors and retail
stores to consumers. Section 736.12 provides that in determining minimum prices for any marketing area the director
shall make an investigation relative to that area of such factors as the quantities of fluid milk distributed and normally
required by consumers, the price to distributors and their
handling costs, and the available capacity for processing and
distributing. Section 736.13 prohibits sale by distributors
at less than the prescribed prices.
The most real danger to the prescribed minimum lies in
sales by distributors at lower prices on areas within the exclusivejurisdiction of the federal government, where transactions cannot be regulated by the state. Prescribed minimum
prices fail of their purpose if they lie in the shadow of cut
prices. The route of the milk from the producer to the consumer is a continuous one even when it crosses the imaginary
line that demarcates federal jurisdiction, and the evil effects
of substandard prices in the federal area course backward
to play their part in undermining the intelligent production
and orderly marketing that the state has declared essential
to the public health. The state has therefore undertaken to
regulate the milk industry within the bounds of its jurisdiction in such a manner as to obviate the elusive evils that it
could not directly attack. Section 736.3 (a) (6) of the Agricultural Code provides that any stabilization and marketing
plan shall prohibit distributors and retail stores from engaging in such unfair practices as,
"(6) The purchasing, processing, bottling, transporting,
delivering or otherwise handling in any marketing area of
any fluid milk or fluid cream which is to be or is sold or otherwise disposed of by such distributor at any place in the
geographical area within the outer, outside and external
boundaries or limits of such marketing area, whether such
place is a part of the marketing area or not, at less than the
minimum wholesale and minimum retail prices effective in
such marketing area."

Mar. 1942.) PAC. COAST bAIRY V. DEPT. OF AGRICUilruRE.

823

[19 O. (2d) 818]

The Stabilization and Marketing Plan for the Santa Clara
Marketing Area contains the provisions outlined by this section. These regulations are directed at the milk before it
can enter the stronghold of an area within the state's boundaries but outside its jurisdiction on terms that would menace the entire milk supply. The alleged violation in the
present case is the purchasing, processing, bottling, transporting, delivering, and other handling of milk within the
Santa Clara Marketing Area for prospective sale at a point
outside the jurisdiction of the state at prices less than the
minimum prescribed for that marketing area. Petitioner
contends that the state's control over activities within its
jurisdiction affords it no authority to impose penalties because of transactions on Moffett Field. This contention proceeds from the theory that such penalties violate the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, denying to a state the power to restrict
or control activities, persons, and property beyond its jurisdiction. (Standard Oil Co. of California v. California, 291
/ U. S. 242 [54 S. Ct. 381, 78 L. Ed. 775] ; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 [17 S. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832]; St.
Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U. S. 346 [43
S .. Ct. 125, 67 L. Ed. 297] ; Compania General de Tabacos
de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U. S. 87
[48 S. Ct. 100, 72 L. Ed. 177] ; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281
U. S. 397 [50 S. Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926].) This contention, however, confuses the state's control over activities,
persons, and property within its jurisdiction and the repercussions of that control in areas outside thereof. The question is not whether the state can prescribe the minimum
prices at which milk may be sold on the territory within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. (Cf. Consolidated
Milk Producers v. Parker, this day decided), but. whether
it 'has power to regulate acts within its jurisdiction even
though they are followed in direct line of succession by a
transaction outside its jurisdiction.
[1] It is established that a state may validly regulate
activities, persons, and property within its jurisdiction, even
though extra-territorial repercussions ensue, whenever such
regulation is vital to the welfare of its inhabitants. The propriety of the regulation is determined by its focus upon an
internal problem and not by the range of its influence. Thus, in
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Mirkovitch v. Milnor, 34 Fed. Supp. 409, the court held that
the state could exercise its police power over boats within
state waters in a manner that was bound to affect their activities beyond state borders. Threatened with the depletion
of its fish supply by the practices of certain· fishermen, California provided in the Fish and Game Code that no person
shall use a boat in this state or its waters that delivers to
any point outside the state fish caught from the boat in the
waters of the Pacific Ocean within the state or on the high
seas or elsewhere without authorization of the Fish and Game
Commission. The court pointed out that the code provision
related solely to the operation within state waters of fishing
vessels delivering their catch outside the state, and empha\lized that the provision was designed not to regulate fishing operations beyond the state's jurisdiction but to protect
the state's fisheries from depletion. The realization that the
plaintiff might be unable to carryon fishing operations be,Yond the state's jurisdiction without entering and operating
his boat within state waters did not deter the court from
declaring that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's
police power over acts within its jurisdiction.
In Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53 [60 S. Ct. 758, 84 L.
Ed. 1074], the United States Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute requiring that insurance policies for persons
or property in Virginia written by companies authorized to
do business in Virginia be countersigned by a local agent
receiving a certain percentage of the commission, even though
insurer and insured are both outside of Virginia when the
contract of insurance is negotiated. The close relation between the insurance contracts and the insured persons or
property, together with the state's interest in protecting
such persons and property, justified the regulation despite
its extra-territorial eff·ect. The court stated: "But the question is not whether what Virginia has done will restrict appellant's freedom of action outside Virginia by subjecting the
exercise of such freedom to financial burdens. The mere fact
that state action may have repercussions beyond state lines
is of no judicial significance so long as the action is not within
that domain which the Constitution forbids. . . . Virginia
has not sought to prohibit the making of contracts beyond
her borders. She merely claims that her interest in the risks
which these contracts are designed to prevent warrants the
kind of control she has here imposed. This legislation is not

Mar.1942.J PAC. COAST DAIRY V. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE.

825

[19 C. (2d) 818]

to be judged by abstracting an isolated contract written in
New York from the organic whole of the insurance business,
the effect· of that business on Virginia, and Virginia's regulation of it." (Pages 62, 63.) (See, also, Holmes v Springfield Fire & Marine Insur. Co., 311 U. S. 606 [61 S. Ct.
19,85 L. Ed. 384]; 32 Fed. Supp. 964; National Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71 [43 S. Ct. 32, 67 L. Ed.
136], and Palmetto Fire Ins. 00. v. Oonn., 272 U. S. 295
[47 S. Ct. 88, 71 L. Ed. 243] ; Brandeis's dissent in New
York Life Ins. 00. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357, 377 [38 S. Ct..
337, .62 L. Ed. 772]; cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya,
270 U. S. 426 [46 S. Ct. 331, 70 L. Ed. 664].)
Again in the application of state workmen's compensation laws, it· is established that where the injury occurs in
one state and the contract of employment is entered into in
another, the statute of the state with the greater interest in
the welfare of the injured workman controls. (Alaska Packers Assn. v.Industrial Ace. Oom. of Oalifornia, 294 U. S. 532
[55 S. Ct. 518, 79 L. Ed. 1044] ; Pacific Employers Ins. Co.
v. Industrial Ace. Oom. of Oalifornia, 10 Cal. (2d) 567 [75
Pac. (2d) 1058].) In the Alaska Packers case the California
Workmen's Compensation Act was held applicable to an injury sustained in Alaska by a workman who resided in California and entered into the contract of employment. here.
The court noted California's interest in the welfare of the
injured workman, stating: "Obviously the power of a state
to effect legal consequences is not limited to occurrences
within the state if it has control over the status which gives
rise to those consequences." (Page 541.) (See, also, J. O.
Penney 00. v. Wisconsin Tax Oom., 311 U. S. 435 [61 S.
Ct. 246, 85 L: Ed. 267, 130 A. L. R. 1229] ; Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412 [57 S. Ct. 772, 81
L. Ed. 1193,112 A. L. R. 293J ; Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
312 U. S. 359 [61 S. Ct. 586, 85 L. Ed. 888, 132 A. L. R. 475].)
The foregoing cases establish that a state may exercise its power over things within its jurisdiction in the knowledge that it will thereby influence things beyond its jurisdiction, and that its influence may be far reaching, so long as
the external consequences remain incidental to the solution
of internal problems. Their application to the present case is
clear. In accomplishing the objectives of the state milk control act the state is concerned, not with the destination and
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sale of the milk but with the effect of the price of the milk
upon the conditions of production. A price below the fixed
minimum for milk produced in the state endangers those
established standards for the milk industry that safeg11ard
the public health, and leads successively to a breakdown of
the law, price cutting, diminishing returns to the producers.
inferior standards of milk production and finally injurious
effects on the public health. The state has regulated the purchasing, processing, bottling, transporting and handling of
fluid milk within its jurisdiction with the object, not of
controlling transactions beyond its jurisdiction, but of stabilizing within its jurisdiction the producton of a commodity
vital to the public health.
[2] The state milk control act, however clear its validity
under the due process clause, must be scrutinized further in
the light of the commerce clause and the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (50 U.S. Stats.
246), held constitutional in United States v. Rock Royal
Co-op., 307 U. S. 533 [59 S. Ct. 993, 83 L. Ed. 1446]. The
federal act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to enter
into marketing agreements fixing minimum prices to be paid
producers for milk that is "in the current of interstate or
foreign commerce" or that "directly burdens, obstructs or
affects interstate or foreign commerce." (Sec. 8 (c) (1),
(2), (5), (7), (8), and (18),7 U. S. C. A. sec. 608c.) It defines interstate or foreign commerce as "commerce between
any State, Territory or possession, or the District of Columbia, and any place outside thereof; or between points within
the same State, Territory, or possession, or the District of
Columbia, but through any place outside thereof; or within
any Territory, or possession, or the District of Columbia.
For the purpose of this chapter ... a marketing transaction
in respect to~n agricultural commodity or product thereof
shall be considered in interstate or foreign commerce if such
eommodity or product is part of that current of interstate
or foreign commerce usual in the handling of the commodity
or product whereby they or either of them, are sent from one
State to end their transit, after purchase, in another, including all cases where purchase or sale is either for shipment
to another State or for the processing within the State and
the shipment outside the State of the products so processed.
. . . As used herein, the word 'State' includes Territory, the
District of Columbia, possessions of the United States, and

~----------'--'----------'------------------------
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foreign nations." Sec. 10(j), 7 u. S. C. A. sec. 610(j).) The
extensiveness of this definition leaves no doubt that Congress
intended to cover the broadest possible field that might come
within its powers to regulate interstate commerce and to govern territories.
The shipments of milk from California to such areas as
Moffett Field, where the transit ends, fall within this definition of interstate commerce, for Moffett Field can be classified as either a territory or possession of the United States
outside the jurisdiction of California, even though within
the state's boundaries.
The contention is nevertheless advanced that transactions
between such federal areas as Moffett Field and the rest of
the state do not come within the power of Congress to reg·
ulate' interstate commerce, because such areas do not fall
within the categories of states, foreign nations, or Indian
tribes set forth in the commerce clause. The judicial inter·
pretation of the commerce clause, however, has greatly ampli.
fied the meaning of interstate commerce. Thus, commerce
between states and territories has long been recognized as
interstate commerce. (Hanley v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co.,
187 U. S. 617 [23 S. Ct. 214, 47 L. Ed. 333] ; Inter-Island
Steam Navigation Co. v. Hawaii, 96 Fed. (2d) 412, aff'd
305 U. S. 306 [59 S. Ct. 202, 83 L. Ed. 189].) Commerce
between States and the District of Columbia is similarly recognized as interstate commerce. (Stoutenburgh v. Hennick,
129 U. S. 141 [9 S. Ct. 256, 32 L. Ed. 637] ; Galloway v.
Bell, 11 Fed. (2d) 558.) Such areas as Moffett Field are in
the same category as the District of Columbia, for the same
power of Congress extends over them both. Cu. S. Const.,
Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S.
647 [50 S. Ct. 455, 74 L. Ed. 1091J; Fort Leavenworth
R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 [5 S. Ct. 995, 29 L. Ed.
264].) In the light of the foregoing cases it is clear that the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, reinforced by its authority over territories and "forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needed buildings" enables it to regulate commerce between states and such areas
as Moffett Field. (Compare People v. Standard Oil Co., 218
Cal. 123 [22 Pac. (2d) 2]; Grayburg Oil Co. v. State [Tex.
Civ. App.], 286 S. W. 489; Grayburg Oil Co. v. State [Tex .
Com. App.], 3 S. W. (2d) 427, and McKesson &- Robbins v.

828

PAc. COAST DAIRY V. DEPT. OF AGRlctrL'rtTRE.

[19 C. (2d)

Oollins, 18 Cal. App. (2d) 648 [64 Pac. (2d) 469], which
did not involve any federal statute· regulating such commerce.)
[3] The milk industry in California is dominantly a local
one. Only a small percentage of the milk produced goes beyond
the jurisdiction of the state, but whatever the destination
of the milk, the state is vitally concerned with thestabiliza·
tion of the industry, and particularly with standards of production, in the state as a whole. The federal territory within
the state is so fragmented that there may be several fed"
eral islands within a single marketing area. If they are citadels of immunity from state jurisdiction, they ate also exceptional segments in areas that are otherwise subject to that
jurisdiction. They stand out like colored pins on the map
of California, and range from military reservations to. soldiers' homes, from court houses to penitentiaries, from post
offices to Indian reservations,frgm national parks to regional
dams. (See cases cited in 38 Columbo L. Rev. 128, at 130.)
The commerce between them and the rest of the state is of
the greatest interest to the state regardless of the circumstance that it may be regulated by the federal government.
Focussed as it is upon a state problem, the state act, despite
its repercussions upon interstate commerce, does not run
counter to the commerce clause so long as it does not conflict with the provisions or objectives of Congressional legislation. (Milk Oontrol Board V. Eisenberg Farm Produots,
306 U. S. 346 [59 S. Ct. 528, 83 L. Ed. 752] ; Duokworth V.
A.rkansas, - - U. S. _.- [62 S. Ct. 311, -_. L.Ed. - ] ;
Oalifornia V. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109 [61 S. Ct. 930, 85
L. Ed. 1219] ; South Oarolina State Highway Dept. 'v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177 [58 So Ct. 510, 82.L. Ed. 734]. See
27 Cal. L. Rev. 615.)
[4] The objectives of the federal act in fixing the minimum
price payable by the distributor to the producer are the same
as those (}f the California act, namely, to insure to the producer a reasonable return on his products (secs. land 2),
and to the consumer a "sufficient quantity of pure and
Wholesome milk." (Sec. 8 (c) (18) .) There is no federal
marketing agreement or order with respect to the milk industry, however, now· in effect in this state. Where a conflict is apparent the state legislation must yield. (United
States V. Wrightwood Dairy 00., - - U. S. - - [62 S.
Ct. 523, - - L. Ed. - - ] ; OLoverLeaf Butter Co. v. Patter-
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son, U. S. [62 S. Ct. 491, L. Ed. _].)
There is a question, however, whether any conflict exists when
a federal administrative officer is· empowered to prescribe
regulati(}ns in a field already regulated by a state but does
not actually do so. The United States Supreme Court has
held in some cases that a conflict of authority is inherent in
such a situation by interpreting the failure of the federal
officer to make any regulation as in effect a ruling that neither
federal nor state regulation is necessary. (Oregon-Washington R. & N. 00. V. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 [46 S. Ct. 279,
70 L. Ed. 482] ; Napier V. A.tlantio Ooast Line Ry. 00., 272
U. S. 605 [47 S. Ct. 207, 71 L."Ed. 432].) There is a growing tendency on the part of the court, however, to emphasize the evils arising from the absence of any regulation, and
to hold therefore that the existence of an unexercised superior federal authority does not rule out state regulation vital
to the public welfare. This realistic view germinated in cases
upholding state regulation of certain public utility practices
that the Interstate Commerce Commission did not regulate
although it had authority to do so. (Northwestern Bell Telephone 00. V. Nebraska State Ry. Oommission, 297 U. S. 471
[56 S. Ct. 536, 80 L: Ed; 810] ; Missouri Pacifio Ry; 00. V.
Larabee FldUr Mills 00., 211 U. S. 612 [29 S. Ct. 214, 53
L. Ed. 352].) The court haS balanced, not the state regulation against the unexercised federal authority, but the importance of the state's objectives against the effects of its
regulation on interstate commerce. It has rejected tlie theory
that the failure of a federal administrative agency to exercise its authority necessarily amounts to a: declaration against
all regulation. Indeed, in H. P. Welsh 00. V. New Hampshire, 306 U; S. 79 [59 S. Ct. 438, 83 L. Ed; 500], it dem~
onstrated its concern with keeping the state regulation alive
in theabselllre of immediate conflict with federal regulation.
It upheld in that case the application of a state act regulating the hours of drivers of motor carriers to a driver transporting an interstate shipment, even though the Interstate
Commerce C(}mmission had OVerlapping authority and had
issued regulations that would conflict with the state act
when they became effective two years later. The court took
the view that the safety of the people shou.ld not wait Upon
federal administrative action. (See, also, Kelly v. Washington, .302 U. S. 1 [58 S. Ct. 87, 82 L. Ed. 3]; South Oaro-
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lina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra; Eichholz v. Public Servo Commission, 306 U. S. 268 [59 S. Ct.
532, 83 L. Ed. 641]; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598
[60 S. Ct. 726, 84 L. Ed. 969] ; Mintz V. Baldwin, 289 U. S.
346 [53 S. Ct. 611, 77 L. Ed. 1245].)
Public health, like public safety, is a vital concern of the
state, and its maintenance at proper levels should likewise
not wait upon federal regulation. Toward that maintenance
the California milk control act contributes largely, but it
might well be disrupted if those engaged in interstate commerce escaped the state regulation while they were untouched
by corresponding federal regulation. The absence of federal regulation may well be a recognition not only of the
propriety but of the effectiveness of state regulation in the
stabilization of a dominant1y local industry, rather than a
ruling that there should be no regulation.
[5] There remains the question whether the milk control act can validly affect milk sold to instrumentalities of
the United States. In a brief filed as amicus curiae on behalf
of the United States, the United States Attorney contends
that the application of the state act to such milk would un·
duly burden the operation of an essential federal agency, and
that it is inconsistent with the federal statutes requiring that
army supplies be secured through competitive bidding. (41
U. S. C., sec. 5; 10 U. S. C., secs. 1200-1201.) Federal agencies, however, cannot entirely escape the effects of state legislation. The California milk control act does not discriminate against the United States army nor substantially hinder
its efficient operation. The army is not precluded from obtaining milk, nor required to pay more for such milk than,
other consumers in the same area. The act regulates not the
army but the distributors who are independent contractors
with the federal government. It is settled that such contractors are subject to state control, and that any consequent
burden on the Federal Government is speculative and remote.
(Milk Control Board v. Gosselin's Dairy, Inc., 301 Mass.
174 [16 N. E. (2d) 641]; Paterson Milk &7 Cream Co., Inc. V.
Milk Control Board, 118 N. J. L. 383 [192 Atl. 838] ; Alabama v. King db Boozer, - - U. S. - - [62 S. Ct. 43,
- - L. Ed. - - ] ; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302
U. S. 134 [58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155, 114 A. L. R. 318J;
Atkinson v. State Tax Com. of Oregon, 303 U. S. 20 [58
S. Ct. 419, 82 L., Ed. 621]; State Tax Com. V. Van Cott,
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306 U. S. 511 [59 S. Ct. 605, 83 L. Ed. 950] ; Helvering V.
Gerhardt, 304 U. S.405 [58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed. 1427];
Trinity Farm Const. Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466 [54 S.
Ct. 469, 78 L. Ed. 918] ; see 27 Cal. L. Rev. 327.) The very
federal statutes requiring competitive bidding except cases
"where it is impracticable to secure competition" (10 U.
S. C. sec. 1201), and Regulation 5-240 (g) of the United
States Army provides that it is impracticable to secure such
competition: "(3) When the price is fixed by Federal, State,
municipal, or other competent authority." (Penn Dairies,
Inc. V. Milk Control Commission, (March 25, 1941) Court of
Common Pleas of Lancaster County,Pennsylvania; Commonwealth v. Rohrer (Pa.), 37 D. & C. 410.)
The alternative writ of mandamus is discharged and the
petition for a peremptory writ is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser,
J., and Carter, J.,concurred.

[L. A. No. 17578. In Bank. Mar. 16, 1942.]

E. W. LAISNE, Appellant, V. THE CALIFORNIA STATE
BOARD OF OPTOMETRY et al., Respondents.
[la, 1b] Physicians-Licenses-Suspension and Revocation-Review-Trial De Novo.-In a mandamus proceeding questioning
an order of the State Board of Optometry revoking a certificate of registration, the court must exercise an independent
judgment on the facts and receive any material evidence, re-o
gardless of the proceeding before the board. There must be
a trial de novo. If the rule were otherwise, there would be
an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power.
[2] Constitutional Law-Distribution of Powers-Judicial Powers
on Boards.-If some agency with state-wide jurisdiction, other
than the Supreme Court, the District Courts of Appeal, and
[1] See 5 Cal. JUl'. 683; 11 Am. JUl'. 909.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Physicians, § 30; [2, 5] Constitu,
tional Law, § 82; [3] Constitutional Law, § 74; [4] Physicians,
§ 2; [6] Administrative Law.
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